With Erdoğan's 'Power-Grab' Almost Complete, What Now?

There are no signs whatsoever about a 'softening' of repressive measures in Turkey; on the contrary, purge continues, as more than 155 journalists are—despite the outcry abroad—kept in jail. 

What is next? Given the small margin of 'yes' votes and the other doubts about the referendum, and Turkey's relations with the West shattering, this is the question. 

Despite all the institutional advantages at his disposal, and the far-right nationalist backing, Erdoğan hardly won a crushing victory in April 16. And he made it a matter of political life and death. 

Will Erdoğan push the pause button in his quest to forge an all-powerful executive? 

Or will he ignore the thinness of the majority—which encapsulates the reality of a country split right down the middle and ready to explode—and proceed as planned?

Prof Ümit Cizre—a top Turkish expert scholar in democratic transitions and civilian-military relations—seeks masterfully correlations between 'what now?' and 'why?' in an extended, widely praised essay. 

'For Erdoğan and his allied pundits, a strong and institutionally secure presidential system provides long-term insurance for the recently achieved status of the formerly aggrieved Islam-friendly social classes,' she writes. 

'It permits Erdoğan to blaze his own warpath, and attack his enemies without being undercut by democratic constraints like separation of powers, a free press and an independent judiciary ... these middle classes have given precedence to material enrichment over anything else, which includes turning a blind eye to the extrajudicial abuse of their friends, neighbors, teachers, professors, doctors and lawyers.'

Cizre's diagnosis of the key issue on Turkey's problems is ultra-seculars' refusal to redefine secularism; and she sees the only hope for future in Gezi protesters — tech savvy, globalist younger generation of 'lifestyle democrats', as she calls them.